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French Polynesia is a colony. In a world that has seen so many former 
possessions of colonial powers achieve independence, French Polynesia remains 
an Overseas Territory of France. Yet, in the early post World War II years, 
there were prospects for political evolution. There was a nascent nationalist 
movement, a literate citizenry--at least in comparison with many other colo-
nial territories--and a moderately stable economy based on farming and fishing 
and the export of cash crops. What happened? Why has political evolution in 
French Polynesia lagged behind most other South Pacific nations, as well as 
most other French overseas possessions? 
This is not meant to be a suspense tale. As you well know, France has 
been most reluctant to consider independence for French Polynesia. While the 
South Pacific dependencies of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
have progressed to independence, or close to it; while the French colonies in 
Asia and Africa have gained their freedom; French Polynesia remains an integral 
part of the metropole in French eyes. France has found this southeast corner 
of Polynesia to be real estate too valuable to give up, and France has also 
found that she can easily push the Polynesians around, or at least gain a re-
signed acquiescence from them for continued French control. 
In 1958 French President Charles De Gaulle gave the French Polynesians 
a choice between voting "yes" to remain in the French community, or "no" for 
immediate severance from France. The late Pouvanaa A Dopa, the charismatic 
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Tahitian leader and head of the majority political party, campaigned for a 
IInoll vote. He lost by a 64% to 36% margin. Shortly thereafter he was dis-
missed from office by De Gaulle. Then he was arrested, tried and convicted 
of the unlawful possession of arms and of having been an accessory in an 
all eged attempt to burn down the town of Papeete. Pouvanaa was sentenced to 
enough years in French jails, and then exile in France, to see him safely 
dead. Charges that the French denied Pouvanaa transport and radio time to 
reach outer island electorate and used other pressures to assure a lIyes ll vote, 
and charges that the case against Pouvanaa was trumped up, may well be true. 
But the apparent fact remains that a segment of the Polynesian population 
then, and perhaps an even larger segment now, has been very timid about the 
idea of independence. It is this timidity that the French have played upon 
to keep Polynesia ~ightly bound to France .. 
It is tempting, however, to imagine that French Polynesia might have 
gone the way of the majority of French African territories that voted lIyes ll 
in 1958. The African territories have evolved towards independence, while 
retaining close political, economic and cultural ties with France. The 
ironic fact, however, is that evolution, and the more violent process of 
achieving independence in Algeria, meant that French Polynesia had to remain 
French--to provide De Gaulle with a site for testing his atomic bombs once 
it had become politically impossible to continue testing in the Sahara. 
The decision to transfer testing to the Pacific may well have been taken 
back in the late 1950's, although it was not announced to the Polynesians 
until 1963. The announcement was in the form of an offer that could not be 
refused, a Faustian bargain by fiat. The bomb, after all, was a matter of 
national defense, and hence beyond the concern of the Polynesians and the 
limited powers of their local assembly. The bomb was really a blessing, 
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argued De Gaulle. It would bring prosperity: the metropole would build 
magnificent new port facilities and undertake other infrastructure improve-
ments; the metropole would assume a larger share of the government budget 
and would institute many new educational and social programs; and most of 
all, there would be thousands of well paying jobs for the people. 1 
While it might be an oversimplification to argue that opposition to the 
bomb--and to continued French rule--was bought off, the promise of massive 
French expenditures and increased economic opportunities was not lost on the 
Polynesians. I recall one day in 1962 when I was attending a meeting held 
in a rural Tahitian district. French administrators were explaining to the 
Tahitians a proposal to have that district, and other districts, transformed 
into municipalities with locally elected mayors and other officials, and local 
budgets. Horrified by the thought that this change might mean new taxes, one 
old Tahitian got up to declare that such a change might be for the good, but 
only so long as "Mama France ll kept footing the bill. 
Even then, in 1962, the Tahitians were enjoying a new prosperity in large 
part paid for by metropolitan taxpayers. Since then the French have, in a 
manner of speaking, kept their side of the atomic bargain. The tremendous 
inflow of funds with the bomb has transformed the territory. Agriculture and 
fishing no longer form the economic base. Most French Polynesians live off 
wage labor--and now most jobs are on Tahiti, the central island of the five 
archipelagoes that make up the territory. Out of a total population for French 
Polynesia of almost 150,000, almost 100,000 live on that island. Tahiti has 
become virtually one urban-suburban unit, focused on the port town of Papeete, 
lSee Bengt and Marie-Therese Danielsson, Moruroa, Mon Amour, Penquin 
Books, Ringwood, Australia, 1977, for a detailed account of the French testing 
program and accompanying political maneuvers. 
., 
22 
the adjacent airport and nearby military facilities. 2 Despite attempts to 
promote tourism and other industries, the testing program is the largest 
single employer for the Tahitians, the backbone of the economy--at least 
according to Paul Cousseran, Francels High Commisioner in French Polynesia. 
Listen to what he has to say: 
1I0ne can be intell ectua lly for the CEP [Atomi c 
Testing Program, ed.], or one can be intellectually 
against it. But the fact is that this country lives 
off it. Three thousand, two hundred families do so 
quite directly, not counting Polynesian military 
personnel. Abo~e all, thousands of families live off 
it indirectly.11 
But salaries paid to Tahitian personnel employed in the testing program 
is only part of the picture. Especially now that the main construction phase 
of the testing program is over, France must keep a high level of funds flowing 
into the territory in order to keep the urban proletariat and the wage econ-
omy afloat. Official government transfers, excluding salaries for military 
personnel and civilians employed in the testing program, probably now exceeds 
$1,000 per capita per annum. 
Two hundred years ago Diderot used Tahiti to argue that man could live 
free from the constraints then binding French society. However ironic it 
might seem, this island, so beloved by European philosophers and romantics, 
has now been transformed into a IImilitary-urbanll complex. But that fate is 
not so unusual for Pacific islands. Hawaii has pioneered this type of develop-
ment, followed by Guam, the Marshalls and now, it would seem, the Northern 
~1arianas. This is a new type of dependency, different from the commercial 
arrangements of more typically colonial and neo-colonial relationships. The 
2See Ben Finney, Polynesian Peasants and Proletarians, Shenkman, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1973. 
3pacific Islands Monthly, April, 1979, p. 7. 
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islands are not significant producers of export crops for metropolitan profit, 
nor are they great markets for metropolitan industrial goods. Their contri-
bution to the mother country is to provide real estate for military bases and 
testing facilities for exotic weaponry, with the rent paid by French taxpayers 
and their American colleagues. 
Have the French Polynesians kept their part of the atomic bargain forced 
upon them? Have they remained loyal to France? In a manner of speaking, yes. 
At least 99.9 plus per cent of them have not openly revolted. There are two 
main political persuasions among the French Polynesians: a Gaullist one and 
a Nationalist one. The Gaullists are in the minority, although at times with 
the aid of French voters, including thousands of soldiers and o.ther metropo.l-
itan testing personnel encouraged to. vo.te in local' elections, they have se-
cured control of the local assembly. Needless to. say, this group has basically 
supported the bomb and continued French rule on the basis that it is best fo.r 
the Polynesians. While it might be easy to say that these pro.-French po.li-
ticians are but representatives of the local bourgeoisie desirous of maintain-
ing their privileged position, many would appear truly to believe that it wo.uld 
be economic suicide for the territory to sever its ties with France. 4 
They are, of course, encouraged in their sentiments by French logic. Let 
me continue the quote from Francels High Co.mmissioner, Paul Cousseran: 5 
"I have said before and I repeat: Independence 
is no.t the problem faced by this co.untry. On the 
co.ntrary its problem is its dependence. Po.lynesials 
pro.blem is that it does no.t pro.duce what it co.nsumes, 
it do.es no.t pro.duce the mo.ney necessary to pay for \'/hat 
it co.nsumes, so. someo.ne must always be fo.und to pay in 
its stead. II 
4This paragraph simplifies a much mo.re complex situatio.n. 
Tagupa, Po.litics in French Polynesia, New Zealand Institute of 
Affairs, Wellingto.n, 1976. 
5pacific Islands Monthly, April 1979, p. 7. 
See, Wi 11 i am 
International 
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The Nationalists, who command the majority of French Polynesian voters, 
and who have been in power most often during the last decades, have not fol-
lowed a particularly radical strategy since the defeat and imprisonment of 
their leader Pouvanaa. Occasionally, their leaders threaten to ask for 
independence. Mostly, however, they have occupied themselves with protesting 
the bomb and asking for internal autonomy, or self-government, within the 
French community. 
The Cook Islands next door provide the Nationalists with a model for a 
type of self-government that greatly loosens the political ties with the mother 
country but which does not cut off the flow of metropolitan funds. The Cook 
Islanders elect their own legislature, and their own premier, and pretty much 
run their own country under New Zealand auspices. Yet they are New Zealand 
citizens, can travel freely to New Zealand and work there, and continue to 
receive sizable grants from their obliging metropole. Tahitian Nationalists 
generally prefer this model to the one with which the French threaten them 
should they seek independence, the model offered by the French treatment of 
their former colony of Guinea. When Guinea voted "no" in 1958, the French 
government pulled out and cut Guinea off without a sou--at least that is what 
the French love to tell the Polynesians, adding that, should they wish to be-
come independent, they will go the way of Guinea. 
The Nationalists' protests against the bomb would appear to have been in 
vain. Protests and boycotts by New Zealand and Australia have, in contrast, 
been effective in helping to force the French to explode their bombs under the 
atoll s south of Tahiti rathe-r than in the atmosphere above them. Nor have the 
Nationalists' pleas for self-government been effective. The French have given 
way here and there, but never enough to make a crucial difference. A very sick 
Pouvanaa was returned early to Tahiti from exile--to die at home. And, in 
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response to the most radical protest staged by the Nationalists--an occupation 
of the house of assembly in 1976--the French promulgated a new statute which 
appeared to give the Polynesians a measure of autonomy. The Governor was re-
placed by a High Commissioner, and a local cabinet with a kind of local prime 
minister was instituted. However, it has not taken long to see that, despite 
these changes, the French are still firmly in control. 
~Jill French Polynesia always be an Overseas Territory, a dependency of 
a European country half a globe a\</ay? Will the French Polynesians continue 
to be split between those who wish to stick tightly to France and those who 
ask for self-government but do not wish to totally renounce France and her 
aid? Jean-Claude Guilliband, the foreign affairs editor for Le Monde, has 
gone on record as unsure of a continuance of the pattern that has prevailed 
over the last decades. In his 1976 book, The Confettis of Empire, devoted 
to the tiny fragments of the French Empire scattered around the world, Guilli-
band ends his chapter of French Polynesia with the sentence: IITahiti reserves 
some surprises. 1I6 
Actually, four years earlier in 1972, there occurred a seemingly sur-
prising departure from the pattern of Tahitian acquiescence. Six young Tahi-
tians, including one part-American who had served with the U.S. Marines in 
Vietnam, stole a supply of munitions from the French army to start a rebellion. 
Though caught in two weeks, they immediately escaped from jail, were recaptured 
and then promptly instigated Tahiti's first prison riot. Although this affair 
has its comic opera aspects, the idea of stealing arms from the French to 
foment a rebellion is definitely something new in recent French Polynesian 
hi story. 
6Jean-Claude Guilliband, Les Confettis de l'Empire, Editions du Seuil, 
Paris, 1976, p. 155. 
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In 1977 came further surprises. A self-styled commando group calling 
themselves liThe Blood of The Ancestors ll dynamited Tahiti's waterfront post 
office. Then, apparently choosing their victim at random, they shot a French 
Metropolitan in his bed. The alleged organizer of this commando group, lithe 
serpent in the Polynesian paradise ll according to the French prosecutor, was 
a relative of the late leader Pouvanaa, a 42-year-old Tahitian with the im-
probable name of Charles Ching. Ching and the other four who actually did 
the dynamiting and shooting were tried and found guilty this past February. 
But they did not pass up the opportunity their public trial offered to 
publicize their cause. Aided by Tahitian politicians ca·lled to the witness 
stand, Ching, especially, succeeded so well in airing Tahitian grievances 
against the bomb and continued colonial rule, that the Le Monde reporter 
offered the following comment which I will use to close this brief talk: 
IIThis trial which was supposed to be about 
terrorism has become a trial of colonialism. Do these 
words, in 1979, mean something to the French of France 
who for the most part have ignored 'the crumbs of their 
empire ' ?117 
7Le Monde (weekly edition) 1-7 February, 1979, p. 7. 
